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Abstract
Background: In Emergency and Medical Admission Departments (EDs and MADs), prompt recognition and
appropriate infection control management of patients with Highly Infectious Diseases (HIDs, e.g. Viral Hemorrhagic
Fevers and SARS) are fundamental for avoiding nosocomial outbreaks.
Methods: The EuroNHID (European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases) project collected data from 41 EDs and
MADs in 14 European countries, located in the same facility as a national/regional referral centre for HIDs, using
specifically developed checklists, during on-site visits from February to November 2009.
Results: Isolation rooms were available in 34 facilities (82,9%): these rooms had anteroom in 19, dedicated
entrance in 15, negative pressure in 17, and HEPA filtration of exhausting air in 12. Only 6 centres (14,6%) had
isolation rooms with all characteristics. Personnel trained for the recognition of HIDs was available in 24 facilities;
management protocols for HIDs were available in 35.
Conclusions: Preparedness level for the safe and appropriate management of HIDs is partially adequate in the
surveyed EDs and MADs.
Background
Emergency Departments (EDs) and Medical Admission
Departments (MADs) are high-risk areas for disease
transmission in hospitals, since they are often over-
crowded, and potentially infectious patients and suscep-
tible individuals may wait in close proximity for several
hours. Moreover, the identification and isolation of
potentially infectious patients may be delayed, because
of high work burden, lack of specific training and skills,
or unavailability of adequate isolation procedures or
areas [1]. In particular, Highly Infectious Diseases
(HIDs, see definition in Additional file 1: Annex 1) pose
a special risk for nosocomial outbreaks, if not adequately
isolated and appropriately managed [2,3].
The European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases
(EuroNHID) project, a 42-month (July 2007-December
2010) European Commission co-funded network, aims
to enhance and maintain co-operation, and exchange of
information and experiences on HIDs management
among infectious disease clinicians, and to enhance pre-
paredness and response to health threats from these dis-
eases within Europe, whether naturally occurring, or
deliberately released. EuroNHID includes 16 European
Countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and United Kingdom),
is managed by a Coordination Team, based at the
National Institute for Infectious Diseases “Lazzaro Spal-
lanzani”, Rome, Italy.
From February to November 2009, EuroNHID per-
formed a survey in 48 isolation facilities identified by
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National Health Authorities as referral centres for the
management of imported or autochthonous cases of
HIDs [4]. Among these, 41 in 14 countries reported to
have an ED or a MAD operating in the same hospital.
The aim of this paper is to present data about logistic
and infrastructures, infection control procedures, and
availability of staff for the appropriate management of
HIDs in these EDs and MADs. Moreover, indications
for the adequate management of HIDs in these settings
are given.
Methods
A cross-sectional study has been performed, in order to
investigate resources and capabilities for the manage-
ment of HIDs in 41 EDs and MADs in 14 countries.
Setting and participants
National health authorities in all European countries
were contacted by the Coordination Team and by the
European Commission, in order to suggest a physician
with expertise in HID management as project partner.
This process led to the inclusion of 15 countries,
while a Norwegian isolation facility later joined the
group after direct request from the Coordination
Team. Most partners are clinicians working in isola-
tion facilities designated for referral of patients with
HIDs. Their areas of expertise include infectious dis-
eases, intensive care, infection control, pulmonary
medicine, occupational health, epidemiology and pub-
lic health.
In order to survey only isolation facilities identified by
national health authorities for the referral and manage-
ment of HIDs, we asked partners to provide official
documents in which these hospitals are clearly indicated.
This process led to the identification of 48 facilities,
which represent all identified centres for all participating
countries except Spain, from which centres from Catalo-
nia only were identified.
Forty-one isolation facilities in 14 countries reported
to have an ED or a MAD operating in the same medical
centre. We define an ED as the department of the hos-
pital responsible for the provision of medical and surgi-
cal care to patients in need of immediate care arriving
at the hospital. The MAD is the department, usually
open round the clock, through which patients are
admitted to the hospital. MADs can operate for planned
admissions only, or for self-referring patients also, but
usually are not able to provide immediate care. Among
the 41 centres surveyed, some had an ED or a MAD
only, and some had both departments: in these cases,
we surveyed the department serving self-referring
patients mainly, because our goal was to identify settings
where patients with HIDs were most likely to be
unrecognized.
Data collection
Data were collected during on-site visits, using a set of
checklists specifically developed. Three checklists were
developed, including 16 main issues and 148 specific
questions. Management of HIDs in EDs and MADs
represents one of the main issues in checklist 1. The
checklists are available on the website http://www.eunid.
eu, after registration. All on-site visits were performed
by the Project Coordinator together with a representa-
tive of the surveyed facility, during the period February-
November 2009. All EDs and MADs were visited, except
2: in these cases, only fulfilled checklists were available.
Outcomes and data analysis
In order to assess the status of each surveyed facility, a
standard Evaluation Form was developed, on the basis
of a literature review and the partners’ expert opinion.
For the literature review data published up to June,
2011, were obtained by searches of PubMed and Med-
line, and from review of the references listed in retrieved
articles, using as search term “Emergency Services, hos-
pital” as MeSH, coupled with general terms such as
“Civil Defense”, “Bioterrorism” and “Hospital Prepared-
ness” and with the name of each HID included as
MeSH term. No data restrictions were placed on our
searches.
In the Evaluation Form all data were summarized in 3
topics: availability and adequacy of isolation room(s), of
infection control procedures, and of strategies for early
recognition of HIDs. The level of adequacy for each
topic is assessed by the EuroNHID expert panel: in par-
ticular about isolation room(s), the panel defined as ade-
quate the availability of at least one isolation room
equipped with at least one logistic or technical feature
as listed in the Table 1; as partially adequate the avail-
ability of at least one isolation room without specific
logistic/technical features; as inadequate the lack of an
isolation room. About infection control procedures, the
presence of all explored features and procedures as
listed in the Table 2 was defined as adequate; the pre-
sence of at least 3 explored features and/or procedures
as partially adequate; and 2 or less features and proce-
dures as not adequate. Finally, early recognition strate-
gies were defined as adequate if trained triage staff or
other procedures are in place on a 24 hour-basis, par-
tially adequate if these staff/procedures are not continu-
ously in place, not adequate if not in place at all. The
Evaluation Form is available at http://www.eunid.eu,
after registration. Two members of the Coordination
Team, including the Project Coordinator, applied this
Evaluation Form for each surveyed facilities, in order to
identify all critical points, and suggest affordable solu-
tions. These Evaluation Forms were sent to the contact
persons at the surveyed facilities, asking for feedback.
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Development of recommendations
On the basis of the selected literature, partners’ expert opi-
nion, and data collected during the surveys, EuroNHID
developed indications for the adequate management of
HIDs in EDs and MADs. These recommendations were
discussed with all partners, and a consensus agreement
was reached during the final meeting, in Rome in May
2010.
Results
From February to November 2009, 41 EDs/MADs in 14
European Countries were surveyed. In the 41 centres
included in our study, 26 had a general ED only, while 4
only had a MAD. In the remaining 11, where both
departments were present, self-referring patients with
suspected infectious diseases are referred to the MAD in
2 cases, while in the remaining 9 self-referring patients
are referred to the general EDs. Consequently, our study
includes 35 EDs and 6 MADs. Given the few MADs,
data are not presented separately.
Thirty-four facilities had at least one dedicated room
for the rapid isolation and evaluation of patients with
suspected HIDs. In 15 facilities these were standard
rooms. In the remaining facilities the rooms were
equipped with at least one specific logistic feature or at
least one technical feature. The availability of these
Table 1 Availability of isolation rooms and their logistic and technical features in 41 EDs and MADs 14 European
Countries
No. (%)
Number of EDs/MADs surveyed 41 (100)
Number of EDs/MADs with availability of isolation room(s) 34 (82,9)
Logistic and technical features of these room(s)
Availability of a dedicated entrance directly from outside 15 (36,6)
Presence of anteroom 19 (46,3)
Availability of negative pressure 17 (41,5)
Dedicated ventilation system 16 (39,0)
HEPA filtration of exhausted air 12 (29,3)
Number of EDs/MADs with isolation room(s) equipped with all explored features 6 (14,6)
Table 2 Availability of infection control procedures in 41 EDs and MADs in 14 European Countries
No. (%)
Number of EDs/MADs surveyed 41 (100)
General infection control procedures
Availability of a general waiting area large enough for the safe distancing between attending persons (at least 1 meter/3 feet) 14 (34,1)
Availability of a reserved/separated waiting areas for suspected patients (e.g. patients with fever and cough) 22 (53,6)*
Availability of plans for the implementation of waiting areas if necessary 28 (68,3)
Specific infection control procedures for suspected HIDs
Availability of (or easy access to) specific PPE 38 (92,7)
Availability of specific protocols for the management of suspected HIDs 35 (85,4)
including criteria for initial diagnostic suspect 32 (78,0)
including initial diagnostic work-up 27 (65,8)
including basic infection control measures 35 (85,4)
including initial medical treatment 20 (48,8)
including steps for alerting and notifying 32 (78,0)
Existence of a dedicated route from ED/MAD to isolation ward for suspected HIDs 25 (61,0)
if yes, by-passing other common areas 21 (51,2)
if yes, the transport is performed by:
stretcher isolator 8 (19,5)
special ambulance through an external pathway 3 (7,3)
different procedures depending on risk assessment 9 (21,9)
with a normal stretcher, without special procedures 5 (12,2)
* not routinely used in all surveyed EDs/MADs
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features is reported in Table 1, and the level of adequacy
in the explored EDs and MADs is showed in the Figure
1.
The availability of infection control procedures and
equipments were addressed in the checklists, results are
summarized in Table 2. The Figure 1 shows the level of
adequacy of infection control in the surveyed EDs and
MADs.
The project explored the availability of triage staff spe-
cifically trained for the early recognition of suspected
HID patients, or alternatively the existence of other pro-
cedures for the early identification of these patients,
such as a syndromic approach. Out of the 41 facilities,
21 have triage personnel with a specific training and
background for the early identifying of suspected
patients, or other procedures in place for this purpose.
In 3 facilities, only some of triage staff have this exper-
tise, thus the early recognition capability is not available
on 24-h basis. Finally, the remaining 17 EDs and MADs
have not specific strategies for the early recognition of
suspected HID patients. The Figure 1 shows the level of
adequacy of this topic in surveyed EDs and MADs.
Discussion
Brief history of preparedness in EDs and MADs
After September 11 and the “anthrax letter” attacks in
the US, plans and strategies for the early recognition of
HID patients (such as those with suspected VHFs or
with smallpox-like symptoms), and for the management
of infectious diseases outbreaks (e.g. due to bioterrorism
attack) have been promoted in EDs and MADs, both in
USA and in many European countries. All surveys con-
ducted in the aftermath of these events demonstrated
severe shortcomings in preparedness [5,6]. A study
addressing the availability of preparedness plans before
and after September 11, showed significant improve-
ments [7]. The SARS outbreak in 2003 also dramatically
changed the approach to isolation and infection control
in EDs and MADs [8], and after its emerging the Cen-
ters for Disease Prevention and Control, and afterward
the World Health Organization, issued new infection
control guidelines, introducing the respiratory hygiene/
cough etiquette measures as part of standard precau-
tions [9,10]. Some years after these events, the Influenza
A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009 became a test-bed, with
encouraging results. Indeed, many EDs and MADs
reported the adoption of interventions for the manage-
ment of surge, including rapid systems for triage, logistic
modifications of waiting and evaluation area, revised
infection control procedures, and modification of staff
number and roles [11-14]. It is, however, likely that
there may be reporting bias of successful experiences. In
real life, it is likely that the presence of plans did not
assure their consistent application: a survey conducted
in Atlanta, Georgia, after the 2009 pandemic, in 26 EDs
revealed that, despite most (92%) of the facilities having
pandemic influenza plans, 6 reported “overcrowding,” 1
reported “severe overcrowding,” and 2 pediatric EDs
reported “dangerous overcrowding”. Moreover, many
reported various space limitations including an
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Figure 1 Distribution of level of adequacy for (a) isolation rooms, (b) features and procedures for infection control, (c) strategies for
early recognition of HIDs (specifically trained staff or other procedures), in 41 EDs and MADs.
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insufficient number of treatment rooms, insufficient
waiting areas, or lack of space to designate a separate
waiting room [15].
After these experiences, it is now clear that EDs and
MADs represent a key setting for the management of
infectious diseases emergencies. Indeed, they serve as
the frontline for patients acutely entering the health
care system, and their personnel are the guardians at
the gate. It is widely recognized, also, that an important
role of EDs and MADs during an infectious diseases
emergencies would be to identify sentinel cases involved
in the event, or the isolated case suspected to be
affected by an HID; while other tasks include an impor-
tant infection control role, the appropriate triage, the
staff protection, the initial diagnostic and therapeutic
approaches, and the coordination with external emer-
gency response and public health authorities [16].
Limits of our study
A limit of our study is represented by the fact that sur-
veys mainly were performed before August 2009. This
means that we collected most of data before that EDs
and MADs experienced the surge of cases due to the
Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, that peaked in Novem-
ber 2009. The experience gained during the pandemic
may have caused modifications and improvements of
procedures and capabilities, not registered in our data.
As the main target of the project were isolation facil-
ities for HID cases, the EDs and MADs surveyed are
operating within, or in the same hospital compound, as
a regional/national reference hospital for infectious dis-
eases: thus, we believe that the occurrence of HIDs is
more likely in these facilities, due to referral of sus-
pected patients from other medical facilities or to self-
referral of patient returning from endemic countries for
HID. This may affect the external validity of our results
as the surveyed facilities probably have put more
emphasis on isolation and infection control issues than
ordinary hospitals which may also have to handle cases
with a HID.
Moreover, we only collected data about the availability
of procedures, but we didn’t assess their appropriateness
or their application in the real-life. Similarly, we didn’t
collected data about the contents, and the completeness,
of staff training.
The indications for adequate management have some
limits, also. Given the infrequency of suspected and con-
firmed HIDs, no high-quality studies exist, or in some
cases no studies at all. Consequently, no evidence-based
recommendations, neither any system of ranking of
recommendations, is possible. Therefore our indications
are based on experiences reported in the literature or
revealed during the surveys, and on the partners’ expert
opinion.
Interpretation of our results
Despite these limits, some comments are possible. In
most of surveyed EDs and MADs at least one isolation
room for the isolation and evaluation of suspected HID
patients is available, but their logistic and technical level
is generally not adequate. Indeed, only 6 have rooms
with all explored items, and rooms with a minimal tech-
nical requirement for isolation according to modern
standards (negative pressure, anteroom and HEPA filtra-
tion of exhausting air) are present in 9 facilities only. In
the remaining 32, isolation rooms are not present, or
not fully adequate. Based on international guidelines
[9,10,17-21], it is our opinion that the following features
are essential for safe and effective isolation: negative
pressure is necessary for the isolation of patients with
confirmed or suspected diseases with obligate airborne
transmission (such as XDR-TB), as well as for the effec-
tive isolation of patients with suspected or confirmed
diseases with opportunistic airborne transmission, such
as SARS, human-adapted highly pathogenic strains of
influenza virus and smallpox; the presence of an ante-
room increases the efficiency of the system, providing
an obstacle against pressure loss, and provides a con-
trolled environment in which donning and removal of
PPE and other procedures can be done safely; finally the
use of HEPA filtration for exhausting air is important in
order to protect the environment and the persons
around the room.
Infection control procedures are generally available in
the surveyed EDs and MADs. The majority of surveyed
EDs and MADs have logistically adequate waiting areas,
or procedures for surge capacity. Indeed, in order to
reduce the risk of spreading of infectious diseases, ade-
quate distancing among waiting persons, or the use of a
dedicated area for coughing and sneezing patients, is
very important. We also explored the availability of pro-
cedures for the early management of patients suspected
to be affected by HIDs: these procedures, which are not
in place in 14,6% of surveyed EDs and MADs, are
mainly focused on early recognition, isolation and infec-
tion control, and on steps for alerting and notifying the
case. However, most of these procedures do not include
strategies for initial diagnostic work-up and treatments,
that are not considered by EDs and MADs their respon-
sibility. However, we believe that certain diagnostic tests
and treatments can be performed by the EDs and
MADs. These include tests to rapidly exclude the most
common causes of fever, such as malaria, in patients
coming from endemic areas. Conveniently, the vast
majority of EDs and MADs have easy access to specific
PPE, such as FFP2 respirators.
All explored features and procedures are not enough
for a safe management of these patients, if the staff is
not sufficiently trained and skilled. Indeed, the
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effectiveness of protocols for the early recognition relies
upon their correct application, or upon the staff aware-
ness of potentially infected patients. According to our
data, specifically trained triage staff are lacking in 41,5%
of surveyed EDs and MADs, and in 7% these staff are
not continuously available. Thus, despite that fact that
these facilities are located in the same centre as a regio-
nal/national reference centre for infectious diseases, in
about the half of them a patient with an HID could be
unrecognized.
Overall, the preparedness status of the EDs and MADs
surveyed is only partially adequate, and this is more sur-
prising considering their location.
Indications for adequate management
Different interventions should be promoted for an
appropriate infection control management in EDs and
MADs. Basically, standard precautions, including
respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette measures, plus
transmission-based precautions, should be implemented
as completely as possible. The triage procedures should
not only include an assessment of disease severity/
urgency, but should consider, wherever possible, also
the risk of disease transmission posed by the patient. A
brief epidemiological investigation of patients with
symptoms consistent with an HID may help in the rapid
identification of suspected patients. Simple standardized
forms should be available for rapid use by triage person-
nel, and should include (i) a brief travel history, (ii) an
occupational history (e.g. the patient is an HCW, a
veterinarian, a laboratory worker, a farmer), (iii) a con-
tact history of exposure to other persons with similar ill-
ness; and (iv) the history of being part of a cluster.
These patients should be placed in separate waiting/eva-
luation areas, if available, or removed as soon as possible
from common areas. Once identified as a suspected
patient, detailed procedures should be available and rig-
orously applied. These procedures should include at
least the basic steps for the infection control measures
to be applied (isolation, PPE to be used, disinfection
issues if needed), and the actions for the activation and
alerting of the response chain. These procedures could
also include, if appropriate, the basic diagnostic work-up
to be applied, and therapeutic interventions. The avail-
ability of technically well-equipped and logistically ade-
quate isolation rooms is fundamental. These rooms
should have a separate access directly from outside, or
be logistically isolated from other common areas, and
should be equipped with an anteroom. Ideally, these
rooms should have negative pressure, HEPA filtration of
exhausting air, sealing of windows and door, and sur-
faces inside should be easy to decontaminate. Finally, all
HCWs, or at least dedicated personnel depending on
EDs policies, should be familiar with PPE use, donning
and removal, isolation procedures and disinfection
issues, as well as with the alert and command chain.
Recommendations about core-curriculum for HCWs
dealing with HIDs have been proposed [22], and should
be adapted by responsible persons to ED and MAD set-
tings. Triage HCWs, in particular, should be specifically
trained in the recognition of suspected patients. This
also implies a continuous updating on outbreaks
ongoing in the world. Operatively, one HCW (from ED/
MAD or from Infectious Diseases department according
to local policies) should be responsible to monitor the
major on-line epidemiological alerts sites and bulletins,
and to disseminate the news to the triage staff.
The application of optimal requirements summarized
in the Additional file 1: Annex 2, including the availabil-
ity of a technically and logistically adequate isolation
room, should be reserved to those EDs and MADs
where it is more likely to have patients with HIDs (such
as the EDs with an high average number of patients
located in the capitals or nearby international airports/
ports, those located in specialist Infectious Diseases hos-
pitals or in the same centre as an isolation facilities,
those located in endemic areas for diseases of interest),
because of the cost of some of these interventions. On
the opposite, the minimal requirements suggested in the
Additional file 1: Annex 2 should be applied in all EDs/
MADs.
Conclusions
Despite the fact that health threats due to HIDs are
constantly present, our survey reveals that the general
preparedness level in surveyed EDs and MADs is only
partially adequate. This is a cause for concern as the
surveyed facilities are located in the same hospital as the
respective regional/national reference centers for HIDs.
Interventions to improve the capacity for early recogni-
tion and appropriate management if HIDs in EDs and
MADs are strongly advised.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Annex 1. Definition and list of Highly Infectious
Diseases (HIDs). Annex 2 Indications for the safe and appropriate
management of suspected HID patients in EDs and MADs.
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